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I have sometimes wondered why I am who I am. Why, out of all the
people in the world, am I this one? Is there not something arbitrary in
the fact that I turned out to be Martin Glazier rather than someone else?
Couldn’t things have been otherwise?
Many have been tempted to answer ‘yes’. Thus David Lewis writes:
Here am I, there goes poor Fred; there but for the grace of
God go I; how lucky I am to be me, not him. Where there
is luck there must be contingency. I am contemplating the
possibility of my being poor Fred, and rejoicing that it is un-
realized.1
Lewis was not alone. Thomas Nagel writes:
My being TN (or whoever in fact I am) seems accidental. . . .
So far as what I am essentially is concerned, it seems as if I
just happen to be the publicly identifiable person TN—as if
what I really am, this conscious subject, might just as well
view the world from the perspective of a different person. . . .
From a purely objective point of view my connection with TN
seems arbitrary.2
And in a similar vein, Bernard Williams writes:
1Lewis (1986, 231).
2Nagel (1986, 60–61). This passage and the one below are quoted in Ninan (2009,
447).
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‘I might have been somebody else’ is a very primitive and
very real thought; and it tends to carry with it an idea that
one knows what it would be like for this ‘I’ to look out on a
different world, from a different body, and still be the same
‘I’.3
These philosophers have been attracted to the ‘contingentist’ thought that
it is possible that I should be someone else.
Contingentism is also presupposed by those philosophers who take it
to be possible that I should become someone else. L. A. Paul, for instance,
has argued that some of life’s biggest choices, such as the choice to be-
come a parent or to pursue a certain career, can be ‘transformative’. A
choice that is transformative in Paul’s sense
involves the possibility of undergoing an experience that changes
you from the self you are now into a different, new self. . . .
When confronted with a transformative choice, you must de-
cide whether to replace your current self and its perspective
with a new self and that self’s perspective.4
Although Paul here glosses transformative choice in terms of the notion
of the self, it is not altogether clear from this passage how she wishes to
understand that notion. But what is clear is that she thinks there can be
distinct things s and s′ such that although I am s, I will later be s′. In this
sense, she thinks it is possible that I should become someone else. But it
can hardly be the case that I will be s′ unless it is possible that I should
be s′. And so Paul must take it to be possible that I should be someone
else. Indeed, anyone who understands transformative choice to involve
becoming someone else is in this way committed to contingentism.5
Despite these philosophers’ attraction to contingentism, however, the
view may seem absurd. For how could I be someone other than who I
am?
The aim of this paper is to show that contingentism is, if not true,
then at least not absurd. I will argue that the tenability of contingen-
tism may be upheld—in fact, can only be upheld—by appeal to a notion
3Williams (1973, 40).
4Paul (2015, 490).
5Of course, there may be other ways of understanding transformative choice that
are not so committed.
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of perspective that is distinctively metaphysical, in contrast to the more
usual epistemic notion. It is in terms of this notion of perspective that
the contingentist may distinguish two senses of metaphysical possibility,
one in which I must be MG and one in which I might be someone else.
Although I have spoken about myself and have asked about the possi-
bility that I should be someone else, in Cartesian style my considerations
are intended to apply to you as well. As you read this paper, you should
translate the arguments I give about myself into arguments about your-
self.
1 The challenge to contingentism
I begin by clarifying the contingentist view and the challenge it faces.
The contingentist claims that it is possible that I should be someone
else—poor Fred, say. But how could I be someone other than who I am?
The contingentist’s claim must not be misunderstood. Although she
does think it possible that I should be someone other than who I am,
she of course does not think it possible that I should both be Fred and
also not be Fred. Her position is rather that although I am not Fred, it is
nonetheless possible that I should be Fred.
There is a more subtle way in which the contingentist’s claim might
be misunderstood. It should not be taken to be a de re claim of possible
identity—a claim of the form ‘◊ (a = b)’. We should not understand the
contingentist, that is, as saying of Fred and me that it is possible that we
should be identical. For Fred and I are distinct objects and objects that
are distinct are necessarily so.
Let us call a statement of the form ‘a = b’ an identification. The con-
tingentist must recognize a nonidentificational reading of statements of
the form ‘I am Fred’.6 It is on this reading that she takes it to be possible
that I am Fred. Indeed, I believe it is such a possibility that Nagel has in
mind in considering whether he ‘might just as well view the world from
the perspective of a different person’ and that Williams has inmind in dis-
cussing ‘what it would be like for this “I” to look out on a different world,
from a different body’. And Caspar Hare, a recent proponent of contin-
6Cf. Nagel (1986, 55): ‘From this point of view it can appear that “I am TN”, insofar
as it is true, is not an identity but a subject-predicate proposition.’
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gentism, also appears to understand the view in this way. He glosses the
possibility that I should be Ralph Nader as the possibility that I should ‘see
the world through Ralph Nader’s eyes’.7 I will have to leave for another
time the question of how precisely this nonidentificational reading is to
be understood. But these philosophers’ remarks give enough indication
of its meaning for our purposes.
This distinction between the identificational and nonidentificational
readings of ‘I am Fred’ might be thought to provide an adequate response
to the challenge to contingentism. For the contingentist may agree that
objects that are distinct are necessarily so and yet insist that it is nonethe-
less possible that I am Fred when ‘I am Fred’ is given its nonidentifica-
tional reading. Of course, no reasonable response to the challenge will
judge it to be wholly misplaced. There is surely something absurd in the
vicinity of contingentism even if it is not the view itself. But the contin-
gentist can acknowledge this. For she may concede that it is not possible
that I am Fred when ‘I am Fred’ is given its identificational reading.
In fact, however, this response is not adequate. For even on the non-
identificational reading there is a point of view from which it does not
seem possible that I am Fred. To see this, notice first that the statement
‘I am MG’ is true on this reading. After all, if we are willing to state the
possibility that I am Fred by saying that I might just as well view the
world from the perspective of Fred, or through Fred’s eyes, then since I
do view the world from the perspective of MG, and through MG’s eyes,
we should admit that I am MG.
What is more, not only am I now MG, I have been MG my whole life.
And this is no accident. It is no accident that every morning I wake up
and once again find that I view the world from MG’s perspective. How
could it be otherwise? That is just who I am! From this point of view,
then, it seems necessary that, on the nonidentificational reading, I am
MG, and therefore not possible that, on this reading, I am Fred. The
challenge to contingentism remains.
Since the contingentist must state her position using only the non-
identificational reading, and since the challenge to contingentism is in
turn stated using only that reading, let us restrict ourselves from now on
to the nonidentificational reading of statements of the form ‘I am Fred’
7Hare (2009, 82).
4
unless we explicitly say otherwise. The contingentist’s position is then
that there is someone else s—someone s such that it is not the case that
I am s—such that it is possible that I am s. The challenge is that there is
a point of view from which this does not seem possible.
It might be suggested that the contingentist should retreat from the
letter of her position. Perhaps she should simply reject the possibility
that I am someone else, even on the nonidentificational reading. What is
really possible, she might say, is not that I am Fred but that I am in just the
situation or predicament Fred is (actually) in. This ‘surrogate’ possibility
claim, it might be argued, avoids the challenge while preserving the spirit
of the contingentist view.
If this surrogate response is to have any hope of success, the surrogate
possibility claim must be properly understood. It cannot be taken to be
the claim that it is possible that what is true of me should be just what
is actually true of Fred, or, to put it another way, that it is possible that
I should satisfy just those open sentences that are actually satisfied by
Fred. For it is actually true of Fred that he is Fred and that he is not MG.
But according to the surrogate response it is not possible that I should be
Fred or that I should fail to be MG.
The surrogate possibility claim must therefore be understood in some
weaker fashion. A natural thought is to understand it as the claim that it
is possible that I should satisfy just those qualitative open sentences that
are actually satisfied by Fred. But I do not think this version of the sur-
rogate response preserves the spirit of the contingentist view. Although
in the case of Fred this fact may be hard to see, in other cases it is man-
ifest. Suppose for instance that I inhabit a universe with twofold (180°)
rotational symmetry. Here I stand, one meter from the axis of symmetry,
staring down my doppelgänger.8 The contingentist will think: I could
have been him! According to the surrogate response, what is really pos-
sible is not that I should be my doppelgänger, but that I should satisfy all
and only the qualitative open sentences he satisfies. But since the uni-
verse is symmetric we may plausibly suppose that I already satisfy these
sentences. Yet it is part of the contingentist’s thought that something
further is possible, something which is not actual: that I am my doppel-
8Alternatively, we might suppose I inhabit a world of two-way eternal recurrence, in
which history repeats itself endlessly with no first epoch and no last epoch.
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gänger. The surrogate response does not do justice to the contingentist’s
sense of unactualized possibility.
In this case, then, the contingentist admits that not only is it possible
that I should be in just the predicament my doppelgänger is in, it is also
possible that I should be him. She should do the same in the case of Fred.
She should insist that not only is it possible that I should be in just the
predicament Fred is in, it is possible that I should be Fred. She should
therefore reject this version of the surrogate response.
Have we considered too weak an understanding of the surrogate pos-
sibility claim? It might be thought that the lesson of the symmetric uni-
verse case is simply that the merely qualitative is not enough: the con-
tingentist must require that I satisfy more than just the qualitative open
sentences Fred satisfies. Of course, we have seen that she cannot require
that I satisfy all the open sentences Fred satisfies. But might there be
some intermediate requirement that will serve?
It has been suggested to me that the contingentist should understand
the surrogate possibility claim as the claim that it is possible that I should
satisfy just those open sentences that Fred (actually) satisfies, provided
that they do not involve either of us. But this version of the surrogate
response does not seem to me to be adequate either. To see why, suppose
there is nothing in the symmetric universe other than my doppelgänger
and me. (Not even points of space, if we are suitably relationalist.) As I
confront my doppelgänger in that inky void, the contingentist will think:
I could have been him! But he and I are the only occupants of the universe
and so we may plausibly suppose I already satisfy all and only the open
sentences not involving either of us that he satisfies. Yet the contingentist
will take something further to be possible: that I am my doppelgänger.
I therefore think that this version of the surrogate response also fails to
preserve the spirit of the contingentist view.
Is there some more subtle version of the response that succeeds? It is
hard to be definitive here, but a case can be made that any version will
face the following dilemma. Either the proposed understanding of the
surrogate possibility claim is such that if I satisfy the condition specified
in the claim then I am not MG, or it is not. If the former, it is inadequate:
the surrogate response, after all, is supposed to avoid the conclusion that
it is possible that I should fail to be MG. And if the latter, then I believe it
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will be possible to construct a case in which my doppelgänger and I both
satisfy the condition. Upon considering this case, I believe, it will be clear
that the contingentist will think that something further is possible: that I
am my doppelgänger. And so the response will be seen to be inadequate.
A different response to the challenge involves distinguishing senses of
‘I’. It will be suggested that the contingentist should take it to be possible
in one sense of ‘I’ that I should be Fred, but take this to be impossible in
another sense of ‘I’. What might these senses of ‘I’ be? Philosophers have
offered a number of suggestions. For instance, Descartes distinguished
the body from the soul. Kant distinguished ‘phenomenal’ and ‘noumenal’
selves. And the early Wittgenstein distinguished the human being from
the ‘metaphysical subject’.
Further suggestions continue to emerge in the contemporary period.
For example, one might distinguish the ‘center’ of a Johnstonian ‘arena
of presence and action’ from the human being who occupies that center.9
One might distinguish the Nagelian ‘objective self’ from the ‘particular
person’ through whom this objective self views the world.10 Or one might
distinguish between Finean ‘metaphysical’ and ‘empirical’ selves.11
Although there is some difficulty in understanding these potential
senses of ‘I’, they are not without interest. But they do not deliver a suc-
cessful response to the challenge to contingentism, since it will rearise
even if these senses can be distinguished. To see this, take whatever
sense of ‘I’ is supposed to vindicate the possibility that I should be Fred;
to fix ideas, let it be my Cartesian soul s. Of course, mine is not the only
soul in the world; there are others as well. The contingentist will surely
wonder: why, out of all the souls in the world, am I this one?12 And if
s′ is a soul other than mine, the contingentist will surely find compelling
the following Lewisian thought:
Here am I, there goes poor s′; there but for the grace of God
go I . . . I am contemplating the possibility of my being poor
s′, and rejoicing that it is unrealized.
9Johnston (2010, ch. 2).
10Nagel (1986, ch. 4).
11Fine (2005).
12Here and elsewhere in this paper, we take the contingentist to be capable of thinking
about me in the first person. Perhaps the figure of the contingentist is therefore best
understood as ‘me with my contingentist hat on’ or ‘me in my contingentist moods’.
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The contingentist, then, will take it to be possible that I should be s′. Yet
I may at the same time reflect that
I am s and have been my whole life. Indeed, it is no accident
that every morning I wake up and once again find that I am
s. How could it be otherwise?
There is still a point of view, then, from which it seems necessary that I
should be s and thus not possible that I should be s′. The problem has
not been resolved, only relocated.13
The contingentist might think to deny that it is possible that I should
be s′, thus leaving her free to concede the necessity of my being s. But
she takes it to be possible that I should be Fred. How can she accept this
possibility while denying the possibility that I should be s′?
She might try to drive a wedge between the two in the following
way. We have supposed that the contingentist’s response to the original
challenge involves taking it to be possible that I should be Fred when ‘I’
refers to my soul s. And so she might insist that it is not possible that s
should be s′ and thus not possible that, in this sense of ‘I’, I should be s′.
But whether or not this is correct, it does nothing to show that there
is not some sense of ‘I’ in which it is possible that I should be s′. And
the contingentist faces considerable pressure to say that there is such a
sense. After all, she finds it compelling that I might contemplate the
possibility of my being Fred and rejoice that it is unrealized. Why is it
any less compelling that I might contemplate the possibility of my being
s′ and rejoice that it is unrealized? Or again, the contingentist finds it
compelling that I might just as well view the world from a perspective
other than that of MG. Why is it any less compelling that I might view
the world from a perspective other than that of s?
But if the contingentist admits that, in some sense of ‘I’, it is possible
that I should be s′, then she will face the challenge. For as before there
will be a point of view from which it seems that, in this same sense of ‘I’,
it is necessary that I should be s and thus not possible that I should be s′.
A related response to the challenge involves distinguishing senses, not
of ‘I’, but of ‘Fred’. One might think the contingentist should distinguish
Fred’s body, Fred’s soul, Fred’s phenomenal self, Fred’s noumenal self,
13Cf. Lewis (1986, 232).
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and so on. She might then take it to be possible, in one sense of ‘Fred’,
that I should be Fred, while conceding that in another sense of ‘Fred’
this is not possible. But the challenge will rearise here in much the same
way as before. To see this, take whatever sense of ‘Fred’ is supposed to
vindicate its not being possible that I should be Fred; to fix ideas, let it
be Fred’s soul s′. Just as before, it will be hard for the contingentist to
deny that, from a certain point of view, it is possible that I should be s′.
The challenge is not easily dismissed!
2 The notion of perspective
The challenge can be met, however, by means of a distinction between
two senses of metaphysical possibility. The contingentist may take it to
be possible that I should be Fred in one sense of possibility, but concede
that in another sense this is not possible. But what is this distinction, and
how can this contingentist response be defended?
It might be thought that these questions are readily disposed of by
appeal to the framework of centered worlds. A centered world is an
ordered pair comprising a possible world and an object said to be its
‘center’. The contingentist might think to proceed in the following way.
She may first introduce a notion of truth at a centered world in such a way
that ‘I am Fred’ will be true at a centered world (w, s) just in case at w, s
is Fred.14 She may then define two senses of possibility. For something
to be possible in the first sense is for it to be true at some world centered
on me. For something to be possible in the second sense, by contrast, is
for it to be true at some centered world or other, no matter whom it is
centered on.
The contingentist may then offer the following response to the chal-
lenge. She may concede that there is no world centered on me at which
‘I am Fred’ is true and thus that it is not possible in the first sense that I
should be Fred. But she may insist that there is a world centered on Fred
at which ‘I am Fred’ is true and thus that it is possible in the second sense
that I should be Fred.
In some ways this is not so far from the response we will ultimately
recommend. But as it stands it is inadequate. After all, why couldn’t
14Cf. Ninan (2009, n. 24).
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someone admit the contingentist’s domain of centered worlds (for they
are nothing but pairs of possible worlds and objects) as well as her notion
of truth at a centered world (for one may introduce whatever technical
notions one likes) but simply deny that her two definitions correspond to
any real forms of possibility? It is not clear why such a position is ruled
out. But unless this can be made clear this response cannot be judged a
success.
I believe the desired modal distinction should instead be understood
in terms of the notion of a perspective.15 Each of us has a perspective. For
example, from my perspective the town of Saxapahaw, North Carolina is
nearby, while from the perspective of Edward Snowden, confined as he
is to Moscow, it is far away.
The sense of perspective I have in mind is metaphysical rather than
epistemic. Of course, there is an epistemic sense of perspective. For
example, we may say that from Plato’s perspective the soul is tripartite,
meaning by this only that Plato takes the soul to be tripartite. But there
is also a metaphysical sense of perspective. Even if Snowden has never
heard of Saxapahaw and thus does not take it to be any way at all, there
is still a sense in which from his perspective it is far away. Saxapahaw’s
remoteness, that is, is part of the way the world is from his perspective
regardless of how he takes the world to be.
It is natural to understand a perspective in this sense to itself have
both a perspectival as well as a nonperspectival aspect. Thus not only is
it part of how the world is frommy perspective that Saxapahaw is nearby,
it is also part of how the world is from my perspective that the earth is
round and that 2+ 2 = 4. To be sure, there is also a more restricted no-
tion of perspective which is without any nonperspectival aspect. On this
restricted notion, it will be the case frommy perspective that Saxapahaw
is nearby but not that the earth is round or that 2+2 = 4. But my concern
here will be with the unrestricted notion.
It will be helpful to allow ourselves a conception of propositions on
which they may be perspectival or nonperspectival.16 The proposition
15Related notions are found in Fine (2005), Hare (2009) and Merlo (2016).
16Such a conception is less controversial than it may appear. For one who usually
works with a conception of propositions on which they are all nonperspectival may
nonetheless be able to recognize a new conception that allows some to be perspectival.
One might, for instance, adopt a new conception on which a proposition is taken to
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that Saxapahaw is nearby, for instance, will be perspectival, while the
proposition that the earth is round will not be. Given such a concep-
tion wemay describe a perspective by specifying which propositions hold
from it. Perspectival propositions will serve to describe the perspecti-
val aspect of a given perspective, while nonperspectival propositions will
serve to describe its nonperspectival aspect.
Might one take a perspective to have only a nonperspectival aspect,
or to be properly described by means of only nonperspectival proposi-
tions? On this view it will not be true that from Snowden’s perspective
Saxapahaw is far away. Instead it will be true only that from Snowden’s
perspective Saxapahaw is far away from Snowden. But this strange view
cannot accommodate the fact of perspectival difference. Consider Jones,
who is visiting North Carolina but has not heard of Saxapahaw. Despite
their mutual ignorance of Saxapahaw, Jones and Snowden differ in their
metaphysical perspectives on it. But surely no two metaphysical perspec-
tives differ in their nonperspectival aspects. For example, it is equally the
case from both perspectives that Saxapahaw is far away from Snowden
and is nearby Jones. This view, then, cannot account for perspectival
difference and so we should not adopt it. We should continue to take a
perspective to have both a perspectival and a nonperspectival aspect.
If this metaphysical notion of perspective is admitted, it is very plau-
sible to take it to have, as part of its perspectival aspect, a distinctively
first-personal aspect. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein imagined a complete
description of one’s perspective in the form of a book titled The World as
I Found It.17 If I were to write such a book, then among its claims would
be statements in the first person. For instance, I will write the sentence
‘I am in North Carolina.’ Nor is my perspective confined to propositions
about the locations of things. For I will also write the sentence ‘I am MG.’
And if, for instance, I am in pain, then I will write, ‘I am in pain.’ The
world, it seems, is somehow given to me in a first-personal way.
Of course, I am not special in this regard. Let us suppose that Snow-
den writes his own version of The World as I Found It. Then somewhere
be a complex consisting of a proposition in the usual sense together with a mode of
presentation. If one thinks there are perspectival modes of presentation, one will arrive
at a conception of propositions on which some propositions are perspectival.
17Wittgenstein (1922, 5.631). Of course, he would not agree with my claims about
the book’s contents!
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within its pages we will find the sentences ‘I am in Moscow’ and ‘I am
ES.’ And if Snowden is in pain, then we will find the sentence ‘I am in
pain.’ Snowden’s perspective, no less than my own, has a first-personal
aspect.
To be sure, we can recognize notions of perspective that are in no way
first-personal. For instance, there is a sense in which it can be said that
from the perspective of an eastbound ship in the Mediterranean, Africa is
to starboard. This purely spatial notion of perspective is without any first-
personal aspect. But our concern is with the notion of the perspective of
a subject, which is plausibly taken to have a first-personal aspect.
If such a notion of perspective is admitted, we face the question of
how its first-personal aspect should be described. We might think to de-
scribe the perspective of Edward Snowden by saying that from his per-
spective, Snowden is in Moscow. But although this statement is true, it
is not sufficient to describe the first-personal aspect of Snowden’s per-
spective. For it is also the case from my perspective that Snowden is in
Moscow and so this description fails to capture the first-personal differ-
ence between us. In the same way, it is not sufficient to say that from
Snowden’s perspective he (or he himself) is in Moscow.
Instead, a proper description of the first-personal aspect of Snowden’s
perspectivemust itself be first-personal. Indeed, the notion of perspective
seems to be an ‘immersive’ one: to describe a perspective wemust inhabit
it, so to speak, and state how the world is from the resulting standpoint.18
We should therefore describe the first-personal aspect of Snowden’s per-
spective by means of a proposition that is not merely perspectival but
first-personal: from Snowden’s perspective, I am in Moscow.
This description cannot be regarded as a piece of ordinary language.
After all, the utterance ‘from Snowden’s perspective, I am in Moscow’
would ordinarily be taken to describe Snowden’s perspective on my lo-
cation, whereas the intent is to describe Snowden’s perspective on his
own location. I do not wish to deny that there is an ordinary-language
sense of perspective in which to say that from Snowden’s perspective I
am in Moscow is to say something about me. But this notion of perspec-
tive appears to be non-immersive and indeed to lack any first-personal
aspect. After all, how in the ordinary sense of perspective are we to cap-
18Paul’s (2016) notion of the ‘agential perspective’ is immersive in this sense.
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ture the perspectival difference between Snowden and me? It is again no
help to point out that from Snowden’s perspective he (or he himself) is
in Moscow and it is not clear how else the difference might be captured.
The ordinary notion of perspective, then, is not our notion of perspective
and so we may set it aside.
Since our description of Snowden is not given in ordinary language,
we need not worry that it fails to conform to the standard view of the
behavior of ‘I’ in ordinary language. Standardly, a token of ‘I’ is held to
refer to the agent of the context in which it is tokened.19 But this standard
view does not extend to our description of Snowden, and it is easy to see
why. Since our notion of perspective is immersive, a description of a
given perspective will be given from the standpoint of the perspective
itself rather than the standpoint of the describer of the perspective. And
so we should not in general expect a token of ‘I’ in such a description
to refer to the describer, despite the describer’s being the agent of the
relevant context.
This nonstandard behavior creates a risk of confusion which it is wise
to guard against. In saying that from Snowden’s perspective I am in
Moscow, we must remember that the intent is to describe Snowden’s per-
spective on his own location rather than on mine. To remind ourselves
we may choose to write ‘I*’ instead of ‘I’ when we are within the scope
of a ‘perspectival operator’. For example, we may say that from Snow-
den’s perspective I* am in Moscow while from my perspective I* am in
North Carolina. But we should bear in mind that this is only a notational
convenience and that the meaning of the two terms is the same.
Even if one takes a proper description of Snowden’s perspective to
require a first-personal proposition, one might object that there is some
ambiguity in our specification of this proposition. We have described
Snowden’s perspective by saying that from his perspective, I (equiva-
lently: I*) am in Moscow. But one might agree with Frege that ‘every-
one is presented to himself in a special and primitive way in which he
is presented to no one else’.20 And one might think on this basis that a
proper description of Snowden’s perspective should specify the ‘special
and primitive’ sense of ‘I’ in which Snowden is presented to himself. Thus
19As in Kaplan (1977).
20Frege (1956, 298).
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rather than (or in addition to) saying that from Snowden’s perspective I
am in Moscow, we should say that from Snowden’s perspective IES am in
Moscow, where ‘IES’ is understood in this special sense. But even if our
description of Snowden’s perspective possesses this Fregean ambiguity,
little will turn on it and so for presentational reasons I will usually not
bother to resolve it.
Let us admit this notion of perspective. I would then like to suggest
that there is reason to accept the following principle:
Veridicality For any ϕ, ϕ iff from my perspective, ϕ.
Put another way, what is the case is aligned with my perspective.
This formulation of the principle involves quantification into sentence
position. We might alternatively formulate the principle without such
quantification by saying that for any proposition p, p is true iff from my
perspective p is true. (Recall that we admit both perspectival and non-
perspectival propositions.)
To see the plausibility of the principle we need only consider cases.
For example, not only is it the case that I am thinking, it is also the case
from my perspective that I am thinking. Or again, not only is it the case
from my perspective that the moon is closer than the sun, it is also the
case that the moon is closer than the sun. Again, not only is it the case
that snow is white, it is also the case from my perspective that snow is
white. In general, then, it seems that what is the case is aligned with my
perspective—that is, that the principle of veridicality holds.
It is important to bear in mind that the notion of perspective involved
in the principle is the metaphysical one. The corresponding principle in-
volving the epistemic notion would not be plausible. For my epistemic
perspective may misrepresent the world: the world may not be the way
I take it to be. A metaphysical perspective, by contrast, is not a represen-
tation of the world and so there is no possibility of misrepresentation.21
All the same, the principle might be challenged. In particular, one
might have a concern about its right-to-left direction. For even if ϕ is
the case from my perspective, what if there is someone s from whose
perspective ϕ is not the case? How then can it be maintained that ϕ is
21I must leave for another time the question of how precisely the relationship between
the epistemic and metaphysical notions should be understood.
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the case? Of course, if the relevant notion of perspective were epistemic
there would be no difficulty here: s might simply be mistaken. But if
there are two metaphysical perspectives that disagree over ϕ, then how
can it be the case that ϕ?
I cannot defend any particular answer to this question here. I only
wish to insist that there must be some answer.22 It is implausible that
claims over which there is metaphysical-perspectival disagreement should
be rejected on that basis. Imagine, for example, that we discover in-
telligent beings who inhabit a planet in orbit around Proxima Centauri.
Although from my perspective the sun is closer than Proxima Centauri,
from the perspective of one of these beings the reverse is true. But the
discovery of such beings would hardly show that the sun is not, after all,
closer than Proxima Centauri.
This point can be strengthened. The special theory of relativity is
naturally taken to entail that the simultaneity of events is a perspectival
matter. Suppose that this theory is true and that at midnight Green-
wich Mean Time fireworks are set off in both London and Edinburgh in
celebration of the new year. From my perspective the fireworks are si-
multaneous. But suppose further that we discover that technologically
advanced extraterrestrials have been surveilling Earth from near-light-
speed spacecraft. From the perspective of one of these extraterrestrials
the fireworks may well fail to be simultaneous. There are, then, two
metaphysical perspectives that disagree over whether the fireworks are
simultaneous. But the discovery of such surveillance would do nothing to
show that the fireworks are not, after all, simultaneous. Still less would
there be any pressure to jettison ordinary claims about, for example, the
lengths of familiar objects or the durations of familiar processes, though
given relativity these too are naturally taken to be matters of perspective.
How could all these utterly quotidian claims be plausibly rejected?
These cases bring out the strength of our commitment to the right-to-
left direction of the principle of veridicality. One feels no temptation to
abandon it even when confronted with the existence of another perspec-
tive that disagrees with one’s own.
22Candidates include the external relativism of Fine (2005), the fragmentalism of
Fine (2005) and Lipman (2016), the egocentric presentism of Hare (2009) and the
subjectivism of Merlo (2016).
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There is no one else for whom a corresponding principle holds. That
is, if t is someone else, then the principle ‘for any ϕ, ϕ iff from the per-
spective of t , ϕ’ should not be accepted. After all, the principle of veridi-
cality says that what is the case is aligned with my perspective. The
corresponding principle for t can therefore hold only if her perspective
completely agrees with my own. But it does not. For at the very least, it
is the case from my perspective, but not from that of t , that I am not t
(equivalently: that I* am not t).
What is the case, then, is aligned with my perspective and no one
else’s. We may say on this basis that I am veridical. In this sense, the
world is centered on me.
Although I (alone) am veridical, this need not be taken to entail that I
am somehow privileged over anyone else. For everyone is veridical from
her own perspective. To see this, note first that since I am veridical, the
principle of veridicality yields the conclusion that from my perspective I
am veridical (equivalently: I* am veridical). Second, recall that the no-
tion of perspective is immersive. If I ‘inhabit’ the perspective of someone
s, I can run through the above reasoning in just the way I have already
done, with corresponding results. There is thus reason to say that from
the perspective of s I* am veridical.
3 A defense of contingentism
The contingentist is now in a position to introduce the modal distinction
that is the key to her response to the challenge to her view. To begin, it
will be agreed on all sides that there is a sense in which it is impossible
that someone else should be veridical. To see this, notice first that it is no
accident that the principle of veridicality holds. Think of the cases given
above in support of the principle; others could be supplied without limit.
They demonstrate a pattern of alignment: something is the case if and
only if it is the case frommy perspective. It is surely no accident that this
pattern obtains.
Consider now someone else s. It is also no accident that what is the
case from the perspective of s differs somehow fromwhat is the case from
my perspective. After all, every morning I wake up and once again find
that I am not s, and so it is no accident that frommy perspective I am not
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s (equivalently: I* am not s). Yet it is also surely no accident that from
the perspective of s it is not the case that I* am not s.
Since it is no accident that what is the case is aligned with my per-
spective, and since it is no accident that s’s perspective differs from my
own, there is a kind of necessity to the claim that what is the case is not
aligned with s’s perspective. Put another way, there is a sense in which it
is not possible that s should be veridical. Since this is a sense of possibil-
ity in which no one else can be veridical, let us call it the proprial sense
of possibility (from proprius, ‘own’). In this sense, the world could not
have been centered on someone else.
Although the contingentist should concede that in this proprial sense
it is not possible that someone else should be veridical, she may insist
that there is also a sense in which this is possible. Her best defense of
this claim, I believe, will appeal to the following principle:
No one’s perspective is impossible For any s and ϕ, if from the per-
spective of s it is the case that ϕ, then it is possible that ϕ.
If there is someone s from whose perspective the world is a certain way,
then it cannot be impossible for the world to be that way. After all, from
s’s perspective it already is that way! She is, if you like, living proof of
this possibility.
I would not wish to claim, nor do I believe, that this principle is ob-
viously true. But it has some intuitive appeal. It is certainly not absurd
or even implausible. And if the contingentist adopts it, then she has the
means for a creditable defense of her position.
The principle, however, must be properly understood if it is not to be
rejected out of hand. The sense of possibility involved in the principle
cannot be the proprial one. For clearly from the perspective of someone
else s, s is veridical, and yet it is not proprially possible that s should be
veridical. The principle must therefore be taken to involve some other
sense of possibility: a nonproprial sense.23
We must also bear in mind that the relevant notion of perspective
is again metaphysical rather than epistemic. The principle does not say
23I believe we can recognize a temporal counterpart of the present distinction be-
tween proprial and nonproprial possibility. The present distinction is therefore more
precisely regarded as a distinction between perspectivally proprial and nonproprial
senses of possibility. I hope to develop the temporal distinction further in future work.
17
that it is always possible for the world to be the way someone takes it
to be. It does not entail, for instance, that if someone takes water to be
XYZ rather than H2O then it is possible that water should be XYZ. The
principle rather says that if the world is a certain way from someone’s
perspective regardless of how she takes it to be, then it must be possible
for the world to be that way.
If we allow the contingentist this principle, then it will be possible that
someone else should be veridical. For from the perspective of someone
else s, s is veridical, and so the principle entails that it is possible that s
should be veridical. In this sense, the world could have been centered on
someone else.
This argument must not be misunderstood. The conclusion is not that
it is possible that I should not be veridical. For no matter who s is, it will
be true from s’s perspective that I* am veridical (equivalently: that I am
veridical). Applying the principle to s will therefore not entail that it is
possible that I should not be veridical; quite the contrary. Instead, the
conclusion of the argument is simply that for someone s such that I am
not s, it is possible that s should be veridical.
The contingentist may now give her response to the challenge. She
may concede that it is not possible in the proprial sense that I should be
someone else, such as poor Fred. For it is proprially necessary both that
I am veridical and that Fred is not. She may insist, however, that in the
nonproprial sense my being Fred is possible. After all, it is nonpropri-
ally possible that Fred should be veridical and thus that what is the case
should be aligned with Fred’s perspective. And surely it is nonproprially
necessary that from Fred’s perspective, I* am Fred (equivalently: I am
Fred). It is therefore nonproprially possible that I should be Fred.
What if the contingentist takes our description of Fred’s perspective to
possess the Fregean form of ambiguity mentioned above? She will then
think that it is the case from Fred’s perspective that IFred am Fred, where
‘IFred’ is understood in the special sense of ‘I’ in which Fred is presented
to himself. And she may think there is no other sense of ‘I’ in which
from Fred’s perspective I am Fred. The fact that from Fred’s perspective
IFred am Fred, together with the principle that no one’s perspective is
impossible, will then entail that it is possible that IFred should be Fred. But
it will not entail that it is possible that I should be Fred in any other sense
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of ‘I’, including the special sense in whichMG is presented to himself. The
Fregean contingentist may therefore need to qualify her endorsement of
contingentism in a way that her non-Fregean counterpart will not.
The contingentist’s defense of her view has involved a crucial appeal
to the principle that no one’s perspective is impossible. Because the prin-
ciple ranges over all subjects, it yields a strong form of the view. For the
strong contingentist, not only is it possible to be someone else, it is pos-
sible to be anyone at all, even poor Fred. But one might wish to restrict
the range of the principle to certain subjects, the Ss, so as to say only that
none of the Ss has an impossible perspective. Such a restricted princi-
ple would yield a correspondingly weaker form of contingentism which
entails only that it is possible to be one of the Ss.
Indeed, it is only a weaker form of contingentism that is presupposed
by those philosophers who think it possible that I should become some-
one else through a transformative choice. For they need admit only that it
is possible to be anyone who might result from my making such a choice,
rather than that it is possible to be anyone at all. They may thus defend
their view solely by appeal to a restricted version of the principle: no
one who might result from my making a transformative choice has an
impossible perspective.
The contingentist views identity in the way most philosophers have
viewed the laws of nature. Such laws are often thought to be necessary
in one sense but contingent in another. Thus it is thought that there is
a sense in which the energy of an isolated system must remain constant
but also a sense in which it is possible for it to increase or decrease. The
contingentist thinks the same about who I am. There is a sense in which
I must be MG, but there is also a sense in which it is possible that I should
be someone else.
This analogy can, I believe, be pursued further. The form of necessity
that the laws have has been thought to be somehow less strict than the
form of necessity that they lack. Thus although it is necessary that energy
is conserved, it is ‘even more’ necessary that two and two are four. No
matter what the laws are, after all, two and two will still be four. In a
similar way, the contingentist should take the proprial form of necessity,
which my identity has, to be less strict than the nonproprial form of ne-
cessity, which my identity lacks. Thus although it is necessary that I am
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MG, it is ‘even more’ necessary that, for instance, everyone is veridical
from her own perspective. No matter who I am, this claim about veridi-
cality will still obtain.
Both the contingentist and her opponent, I have argued, should see
the world as centered on me. Moreover, both should see this centering
as an immutable feature of reality. Yet for the contingentist it is, for
all that, not so immutable. There is a sense in which the world might
shift on its axis—a sense in which someone else might be found at its
center. Although I have the perspective of MG, and have it necessarily,
it is nonetheless possible that I should instead have the perspective of
another.24
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